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Shifts in the long-run rate of productivity growth|such as those experienced by the
U.S. economy in the 1970s and 1990s|are dicult, in real time, to distinguish from
transitory ﬂuctuations. In this paper, we analyze the evolution of forecasts of long-
run productivity growth during the 1970s and 1990s and examine in the context of
a dynamic general equilibrium model the consequences of gradual real-time learning
on the responses to shifts in the long-run productivity growth rate. We nd that a
simple updating rule based on an estimated Kalman lter model using real-time data
describes economists' long-run productivity growth forecasts during these periods ex-
tremely well. We then show that incorporating this process of learning has profound
implications for the eects of shifts in trend productivity growth and can dramatically
improve the model's ability to generate responses that resemble historical experience.
If immediately recognized, an increase in the long-run growth rate causes long-term
interest rates to rise and produces a sharp decline in employment and investment, con-
trary to the experiences of the 1970s and 1990s. In contrast, with learning, a rise in
the long-run rate of productivity growth sets o a sustained boom in employment and
investment, with long-term interest rates rising only gradually. We nd the character-
ization of learning to be crucial regardless of whether shifts in long-run productivity
growth owe to movements in TFP growth concentrated in the investment goods sector
or economy-wide TFP.
JEL Codes: E13, E32, D83, O40.
Keywords: DGE models, Kalman-lter, Real-time data, Learning, Productivity growth.1 Introduction
An extensive literature has studied the eects of shocks to the level of productivity in
dynamic general equilibrium models. Surprisingly, despite the attention that has been
paid to documenting and understanding the 1970s productivity slowdown and the 1990s
acceleration, there has been relatively little formal analysis in the DGE framework on the
eects of a sustained shift in the rate of growth of productivity.1 A notable exception is
Campbell (1994), who found that in a real business cycle model a highly persistent reduction
in the productivity growth rate yielded the \perverse" response of a rise in employment
and output (see also the recent paper by Pakko, 2002).2 This result seems at odds with the
conventional wisdom that the productivity slowdown in the 1970s contributed to the woeful
macroeconomic performance of that decade and that the productivity acceleration of the
1990s was a central factor behind the remarkable performance in the late 1990s (Blinder
and Yellen 2002).
Research on the eects of a shift in long-run productivity growth has tended to assume
that agents immediately recognize the nature of such a shock and modify their expectations
and actions accordingly. In practice, sizable transitory ﬂuctuations in productivity growth
obscure one's view of the underlying trend growth rate. As a result, it takes years for even
professional economists to recognize that a shift has occurred, as evidenced by the debate
about the nature of the productivity slowdown during the 1970s and the acceleration in
the 1990s. In 1997, for example, Blinder (1997) placed the trend rate of labor productivity
growth at 1.1 percent, consistent with the average pace of productivity growth over the
preceding 23 years. Two years later, Gordon (1999) estimated trend productivity growth
to be 1.85 percent, a gure that he revised up to 2.25 percent in 2000 (in part due to
methodological changes in the national income accounts), and again to 2.5 percent in 2003
1Studies that provide early analysis of the causes of the productivity slowdown in the 1970s include
Denison (1979) and Norsworthy, Harper, and Kunze (1979), and the references cited therein. Jorgenson and
Stiroh (2000), Oliner and Sichel (2000), Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001), and Gordon (2003) examine the
sources of the pickup in productivity growth in the 1990s.
2Other exceptions include include Brayton and Reifschneider (2001), who study the eects of a shift in
the long-run rate of productivity growth using the Federal Reserve Board's large-scale macroeconometric
model, and Braun (1984) and Ball and Mott (2001), who study the eects on inﬂation in reduced-form
models.
1(see Gordon 1999, 2000, 2003). As shown in this paper, this pattern of gradual learning
about shifts in long-run growth rate applies to both the 1970s and 1990s episodes.
In this paper we examine real-time estimates of trend productivity growth and compare
these to the predictions of a simple linear updating rule based on an estimated Kalman lter
model. We document that projections of long-run growth by economists and professional
forecasters adjust only gradually to this type of structural change: In the 1990s, for example,
the long-run productivity growth rate picked up signicantly around the middle of the
decade, however, as noted above and documented below, the corresponding estimates by
economists and professional forecasters changed little until 1999 and shot up dramatically
in 2000.
We nd that the real-time predictions of an estimated Kalman lter model track closely
the year-to-year movements in long-run expectations during both the 1970s and the 1990s.
Although economists use a wide variety of methods to estimate long-run trends, as discussed
by Lansing (2000), a simple linear updating rule approximates these methods extremely well.
Our model forecasts are constructed using a real-time dataset of labor productivity that we
collected. We show that the use of real-time data is crucial for understanding the historical
evolution of long-run expectations.3 Data revisions were especially pronounced during the
late 1990s, and they shaped the pattern of long-run expectations at the time.
We then examine the eects of learning regarding long-run productivity growth on the
responses to shifts in the trend growth rate in a standard optimization-based dynamic
general equilibrium model. Following on the results of Cummins and Violante (2002),
who emphasize the importance in the 1990s of shifts in the growth rate of productivity in
the investment-goods sector, we analyze shifts both to aggregate total factor productivity
(TFP) and to TFP in the investment goods sector alone. We calibrate the learning rate to be
consistent with the Kalman lter estimates and the survey evidence of long-run expectations.
We assume that agents in the model economy use the same Kalman lter updating formula
for long-run productivity growth that we found ts the survey data. One criticism of this
assumption is that agents may have greater information regarding their own idiosyncratic
economic prospects than the macroeconomic forecasters have about the aggregate rate of
productivity. Nonetheless, the expected future trajectory of any individual's wages and rates
3Our results are similar in spirit to those of Orphanides (2001) who examined the role of data revisions
in analyzing historical monetary policy.
2of return depend on the aggregate level of wages and rates of return. Thus, in forecasting
the common component of wages and rates of return, agents face the same signal extraction
problem as macroeconomic forecasters.
We nd that gradual recognition through learning has profoundly dierent implications
from immediate recognition for the economic eects of a shift in trend productivity growth.4
With gradual recognition through learning, we nd that a permanent increase in the rate
of productivity growth boosts hours and investment at the onset of the shock and leads to
a sustained boom in employment and output growth. Under these learning assumptions,
agents initially believe that the shock is mainly transitory in nature and therefore has
minimal long-run implications for interest rates and the capital stock. As a result, the
stimulative eects of high productivity on employment and investment dominate and a
sustained boom ensues. In addition, with learning, long-term real bond rates rise only
gradually in response to a productivity acceleration, consistent with the evidence from
the late 1990s. In contrast, with immediate recognition, we obtain Campbell's \perverse"
eects; specically, a rise in long-run productivity growth elicits a rise in the natural rate
of interest. The resulting rise in real rates reduces the optimal ratio of capital to output,
implying that the existing stock of capital is too high. The productivity acceleration and
the implied capital overhang then generate a sharp decline in investment and employment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the evidence on real-time estimates
of long-run productivity growth during the 1970s and 1990s. Section 3 describes a simple
Kalman lter model and compares its real-time predictions of long-run productivity to evi-
dence from surveys and other documents. Section 4 describes both our optimization-based
dynamic general equilibrium model and the nonlinear model solution method. Section 5
analyzes the steady-state and dynamic implications of shifts in the growth rates of aggregate
and investment goods sector TFP. Section 6 concludes.
2 Real-time Estimates of Long-Run Productivity Growth
In this section, we document the real-time evolution of expectations of long-run productivity
growth during the 1970s and the 1990s, two periods during which the actual trend shifted
4This paper focusses on the implications for the real side of the economy. In Edge, Laubach, and
Williams (2003), we further examine the implications of gradual recognition of a shift in long-run productivity
growth on prices and monetary policy.
3Figure 1: Labor Productivity Growth




















dramatically. Throughout this paper, we focus on labor productivity, as opposed to total
factor productivity (TFP), because there exist little historical data on real-time estimates
of long-run TFP growth with which to compare our model.
2.1 Shifts in Long-Run Productivity Growth
The \trend" rate of productivity growth has ﬂuctuated signicantly over the past 50 years;
however, these movements are dwarfed by the year-to-year transitory ﬂuctuations in the rate
of productivity growth. The solid line in Figure 1 shows the annual growth rate of labor
productivity (output per hour) in the nonfarm business sector for 1948{2003; the dashed line
shows a retrospective estimate of trend productivity growth constructed using the HP lter
(with a smoothing parameter of 100). The trend line shows that labor productivity growth
was about 3 percent on average through the mid-1960s, slowed to 1-1/2 percent in the
1970s, and rose again to nearly 3 percent in the late 1990s and early in the 21st century.
Statistical tests provide evidence of variation in long-run productivity growth. An
Andrews-Lee-Ploberger (1996) test for a single break in the growth rate of nonfarm labor
4Table 1: Real-time Estimates of Long-Run Productivity Growth, 1995{2004
Vintage of Estimate (January/February)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
CBO 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.3 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.2
CEA 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1
SPF 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.6
Change from 1995
CBO | -.1 -.1 .2 .5 1.0 1.4 .9 .9 .9
CEA | .0 .0 .1 .1 .8 1.1 .9 .9 .9
S P F | - . 1 - . 2 - . 1. 1. 8. 9. 6. 8 1 . 0
productivity yields a p-value of about 10 percent for the null of no break; the correspond-
ing p-value for business sector productivity (which includes the agricultural sector) is only
about 1 percent. In addition, a number of researchers have found evidence of time variation
in the trend GDP growth rate using the Kalman lter (Stock and Watson 1998; Brainard
and Perry 2000; Roberts 2001; Gordon 2003; and Laubach and Williams 2003). Finally,
Kahn and Rich (2003) estimate a Markov switching model for trend growth and nd strong
evidence for two states corresponding to \low" and \high" growth rates.
Although swings in the long-run rate of productivity growth seem relatively clear in
hindsight, they are hard to identify in real time because they are clouded by transitory
movements in productivity growth. The standard deviation of productivity growth is about
equal to the magnitude of the shifts that occurred in the early 1970s and the mid-1990s. In
addition, as shown below, data revisions further hinder the problem of identifying shocks.
We now examine the real-time estimates of trend productivity growth taken from published
sources.
2.2 Forecasts of Long-run Productivity Growth
Table 1 reports the real-time estimates of long-run labor productivity growth reported by
the Congressional Budget Oce (CBO) in its annual Budget and Economic Outlook,t h e
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) in the annual Economic Report of the President (ERP)
published in January or February each year, and the mean estimate from the February report
of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). A description of the data sources and the
5data series themselves are provided in the Appendix.5 The three series follow the same
pattern over this period. The dierences in levels across the surveys may in part reﬂect
dierences in concepts of labor productivity.6
Real-time estimates of long-run productivity growth adjusted only gradually to the
shift in underlying trend productivity growth during the 1990s. They dipped a bit in 1997,
and edged up in each of the next two years. Then, in 2000, they shot up, increasing by
0.5 percentage point (CBO) and 0.7 percentage point (CEA and SPF), after which they fell
following the 2001 recession. Compared to real-time estimates in 1995, the 2004 vintage
real-time estimates were up about 1 percentage point.
Hard data on real-time estimates of long-run productivity growth during the 1970s
are more dicult to come by; still, the available evidence indicates that economists only
gradually recognized the occurrence of the slowdown and only after ve years or so fully
appreciated its magnitude. The CEA is the single source that approaches that of a consistent
time series. Table 2 reports real-time estimates of trend productivity growth from the ERP
for those years between 1970 and 1980 that such estimates were reported or could be directly
inferred from the text of the Report and supporting documents.
During the 1970s, the CEA revised down its forecasts of trend productivity growth in a
series of steps. In early 1970, its estimate of trend productivity growth in the entire economy
was 2.8 percent; in 1974, it revised the estimate down 0.4 percentage point; in 1977 the
estimate was revised down another 0.3 percentage point and then a further 0.6 percentage
point in 1979. The revisions in 1977 and 1979 were accompanied by detailed discussions in
the ERP outlining the CEA's reassessments of long-run productivity and output trends.7
5As noted in the Appendix, only the CEA provides a reasonably consistent time series of medium-run
productivity projections that starts before the early 1990s. Explicit estimates from the CBO rst appear in
the mid-1990s, and the SPF rst started asking a question on long-run productivity growth in 1992.
6The projections reported by the CBO and CEA during this period explicitly refer to output per hour
in the nonfarm business sector, while the SPF survey simply refers to productivity growth. Productivity
growth can dier according to the measure used; for example, output per hour in the overall business sector
averaged 0.2 percentage points higher than that in the nonfarm business sector during 1973-1995 (according
to data available in early 1996), which is about the dierence between the SPF and CBO estimates of
long-run productivity growth in 1996.
7See also Clark (1978), a sta member at the CEA at the time, who provides a detailed analysis of
the evidence for and causes of the productivity slowdown. By comparison, Perry (1977) remained very
optimistic about productivity's trend growth rate in 1977. It was not until the late 1970s that a consensus
6Table 2: CEA Real-time Forecasts of Trend Productivity Growth, 1970{1980
Vintage of Estimate (January/February)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
2.8 2.8 | | 2.4 | | 2.1 2.1 1.5 1.5
Change from 1970
| .0 | | -.4 | | -.7 -.7 -1.3 -1.3
Notes: Observations are from Economic Report of of the President of the
indicated year (the 1972, 1973, 1975, and 1976 issues did not report estimates).
By the end of the decade, the estimate had fallen 1.3 percentage point to 1.5 percent.
The evidence from real-time estimates indicates that professional economists only grad-
ually recognized the occurrence and extent of the productivity slowdown of the 1970s and
the acceleration during the 1990s. Indeed, full adjustment to the new trend rate of growth
appears to have taken many years. We now examine whether the observed pattern of long-
run expectations can be explained by a standard signal extraction model using real-time
data.
3 Estimating Long-Run Productivity Growth
We now formalize the problem of estimating the trend growth rate by ltering out transitory
ﬂuctuations from observed productivity. As noted above, shifts in the trend growth rate of
productivity appear to be infrequent, while year-to-year swings in productivity growth are
common. A frequently used tool for estimating the trend growth rate of productivity or out-
put is the Kalman lter (Stock and Watson 1998, Brainard and Perry 2000, Roberts 2001,
Laubach and Williams 2003). A key advantage of the Kalman lter is that under a partic-
ular set of assumptions regarding the data generating processes for productivity growth, it
reduces to a simple linear updating formula for estimating the trend rate of productivity
growth.
regarding a productivity slowdown in the 1970s began to form among academic economists (see Denison
1979, Norsworthy, Harper, and Kunze 1979, and references therein.)
73.1 The Kalman Filter
Consider the following stylized model of transitory and permanent components of labor
productivity growth. Denote the level of labor productivity by Pt, and its trend gross
growth rate by Gp;t, and dene the log-level of labor productivity as pt (= lnPt)a n dt h e
trend net growth rate as gp;t (= lnGp;t). Let the stochastic laws of motion for pt and gp;t
be given by
pt = pt−1 + gp;t + t; t  N(0;2
); (1)
gp;t = gp;t−1 + t; t  N(0;2
); (2)
where the disturbances t and t are assumed to be serially uncorrelated with Gaussian
distribution and zero contemporaneous correlation.8 The disturbance t corresponds to a
permanent shock to the level of productivity, while t is a shock to the trend growth rate of
productivity. We do not claim that this is a correctly specied model of the data generating
process for labor productivity growth, but instead view this specication as a parsimonious
and tractable approximation to a variety of data generating processes for highly persistent
shifts in the trend growth rate.
We assume that agents observe the level of labor productivity, but not its decomposition
into the trend growth rate and level components. We further assume that agents know,
that is, have estimated on past data, the signal-to-noise ratio   2
=2
. Given a new
observation of pt, the prior estimate of the trend growth rate ^ gp;t−1 is updated by applying
the steady-state Kalman lter:
^ gp;t =^ gp;t−1 + (pt − ^ gp;t−1); (3)










for >0. This lter is optimal under the assumptions of the model (see Harvey 1989 for
a full treatment).
8We also analyzed a version of this model that included variables related to the cyclical state of the
economy that exert a transitory inﬂuence on measured productivity growth, such as cyclical utilization of
factor inputs and adjustment costs, as in Nadiri and Rosen (1969). The results were very similar to those
from the simple model described above.
8The key parameter for the Kalman lter is the gain  that translates surprise movements
in the level of technology into perceived movements in the trend growth rate. Stock and
Watson (1998) estimate a quarterly model of GDP growth similar to that described above
with data through 1995, and their estimate implies a value of  of 0.03 (per quarter).
Estimates by Roberts (2001) and Laubach and Williams (2003) that are based on data
through the end of the 1990s imply somewhat higher values for the gain.9 In each case, the
condence bands around these estimates of the gain are very wide; for example, Laubach
and Williams (2003) nd that the 90 percent condence interval for their estimate of 
includes zero.
Based on the Stock and Watson (1998) estimate, for our model of annual data, we take
0.115 as our benchmark value of . Given the uncertainty regarding estimates of ,w ea l s o
consider two alternative values of : a lower value of 0.08 and a higher value of 0.22, where
the latter is equal to the value reported by Roberts (2001).
3.2 Real-time Kalman Filter Estimates
To compute real-time Kalman lter estimates, we rst construct a set of real-time historical
annual data series of labor productivity, where each vintage of data corresponds to the data
available to economists at the end of January, about the time when estimates from the
CBO, CEA, and the SPF are reported. Throughout, the data source for a vintage is the
ERP, which is published near the beginning of the year.10
As we show in detail below, the use of real-time data is crucial for understanding the
evolution of historical long-run forecasts of productivity growth, especially during the late
9Note that all of these estimates are based on nal, revised data, and therefore they ignore real-time
measurement error noise that should damp the response of estimates of trend growth to unrevised data on
productivity. As a result, these estimates of the gain are likely biased upwards relative to the optimal gain.
The Kalman lter can be extended to include measurement error, which would yield a more complicated
updating rule. We leave that for future research.
10Fourth-quarter data for the preceding year is not yet published in early January. Therefore, we construct
a proxy for the fourth-quarter rate of productivity growth equal to the rate of productivity growth over the
preceding three quarters. We then compute the annual growth rate using the published data for the rst
three quarters and our proxy for fourth-quarter growth. As a check on our method, we constructed alter-
native estimates using the real-time estimate of fourth-quarter productivity from the January or February
Greenbook prepared by the sta of the Board of Governors for years that data is publicly available (through
1999). The resulting Kalman lter estimates were nearly identical to those reported in the paper.
9Table 3: Real-time Productivity Growth Data
Data Vintage (January)
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1990 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3
1991 1.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3
1992 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 4.1 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6
1993 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
1994 2.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
1995 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6
1996 0.7 1.3 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
1997 1.9 1.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.6
1998 2.1 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6
1999 2.8 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.7
2000 4.4 3.3 2.9 2.8
2001 1.7 1.1 2.2
2002 4.9 4.8
2003 4.2
1990s when data revisions were substantial.11 Table 3 reports the published rates of growth
of labor productivity in the nonfarm business sector for each vintage of data from 1995
through 2004 (as described above). Published gures for productivity growth, especially
for 1995 and 1996, changed dramatically as the data were revised. According to the 1997
vintage, productivity growth actually slowed in 1995 and 1996 relative to its average over
the previous 20 years. The 1999 vintage exhibits upward revisions to productivity growth
for 1995 and 1996, along with a strong gure for 1998. A portion of the upward revision
in the 2000 vintage of productivity data reﬂects changes in the way that gross domestic
output is measured in the national income accounts. According to analysis in the 2000
ERP, methodological changes boosted measured real GDP growth by 0.4 percentage point
in 1987{1994, and by 0.2 percentage point in 1995{1998.
We next compute annual real-time Kalman lter estimates of trend productivity growth
using our real-time data sets and the estimated value of the Kalman gain. For each vintage
11Gordon (2000) also emphasizes the importance of data revisions and changes in methodology in account-
ing for revisions to his estimates of trend productivity growth.
10Table 4: Kalman Filter Estimates of Long-Run Productivity Growth, 1995{2004
Gain Year
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Real-time data
Benchmark 0.115 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.6
Low gain 0.078 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.4
High gain 0.219 1.5 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.1 2.6 2.2 2.6 3.2
Change from 1995
Benchmark 0.115 | -.2 -.3 -.2 .0 .6 .8 .6 .9 1.3
L o w g a i n 0 . 0 7 8 |. 0 - . 2 - . 1. 1. 5. 7. 5. 7 1 . 0
High gain 0.219 | -.5 -.5 -.4 .0 .7 1.1 .7 1.1 1.7
Revised data
Benchmark 0.115 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.5
Low gain 0.078 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3
High gain 0.219 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.8 3.1
Change from 1995
Benchmark 0.115 | -.1 .0 .0 .1 .2 .3 .3 .7 .9
Low gain 0.078 | -.1 .0 .0 .0 .1 .2 .2 .4 .6
High gain 0.219 | -.2 .0 .0 .3 .5 .6 .6 1.2 1.5
Notes: Real-time data simulations use data vintage available in January of indicated year.
Revised data simulations use data vintage available as of February 2004.
of productivity data, we start with an initial estimate of trend productivity growth and
apply equation (3) to generate a time series of trend productivity estimates. The estimate
for the last year of the time series|which is for the year before the vintage year|is our
Kalman lter real-time estimate of labor productivity for the vintage year.12 The resulting
12Because we have historical data on productivity going back several decades, the estimates of trend
growth at the end of the sample in any vintage are relatively insensitive to the assumed initial value of our
state variable, trend productivity growth. For vintages through 1991, we have real-time productivity data
back to 1947. For these vintages, we set the 1948 initial value of trend productivity growth at 3 percent,
consistent with the average rate of productivity growth in the rst 10 years of the sample. For vintages after
1991, we generally have only real-time productivity data back to 1959, and we set the 1959 estimate of trend
productivity to 2.6 percent, consistent with the value implied by the benchmark Kalman lter estimate from
the 1991 vintage. For the current vintage, we have data back to 1947.
11Figure 2: Evolution of Long-run Productivity Forecasts, 1996{2004











Kalman filter: real−time data
Kalman filter: revised data
Notes: Each series is measured relative to its 1995 value. In each case, the Kalman gain
is the benchmark value of 0.115.
time series is reported in the Appendix. The estimates for vintages 1995 through 2004,
implied by a gain  of 0.115, are reported in the rst row of Table 4. The second row shows
the estimates using the lower gain and the third row shows those from using the higher value
of the gain. The fourth through sixth rows show the changes in the Kalman lter estimates
from their respective 1995 values. (We return to the lower part of the table below.)
The year-to-year movements in the benchmark real-time Kalman lter estimates of trend
productivity growth track those in the published estimates closely. The solid line in Figure 2
shows the changes in the mean estimates from the SPF plotted as deviations from its 1995
value.13 A striking feature of the Kalman lter estimates is that they not only follow the
overall pattern of the SPF estimates, but they also follow all three turning points in the
survey series (including the dips in 1997 and 2002 and the upturns in 1998, 2003, and
13As noted above, the levels of the series may dier owing to dierent measures of productivity. We are
primarily interested in how such measures vary over time, and the normalization to a base year facilitates
such comparisons.
122004). Although not shown in the gure, the Kalman lter estimates also track well the
estimates from the CBO and the CEA reported in Table 1. In addition, the benchmark
Kalman lter estimates line up well with the real-time estimates reported by Blinder (1997)
and Gordon (1999, 2000, 2003) in the introduction of the paper. Note that since only past
data on productivity growth are used in constructing the Kalman lter estimates, the close
correspondence between these estimates and the published real-time estimates cannot be
attributed to some auxiliary assumptions or data.
The Kalman lter estimates that use the higher value of the gain are more volatile
than those in the SPF and those from the CBO, and the CEA. As seen in Table 4, the
Kalman lter estimate using the high value of the gain is 1.7 percentage points above its
1995 level in 2004, while the published estimates rose only about 1 percentage point over the
same period. The Kalman lter estimates based on a lower value of the gain of 0.078, also
reported in Table 4, are smoother than the benchmark estimate, and track the changes in
the SPF over the 1996-2004 period about as well as the benchmark Kalman lter estimates.
Indeed, a value of  of about of 0.10 yields Kalman lter estimates that best t the changes
in the SPF over this sample.
The close t of the Kalman lter estimates of trend productivity growth to the pub-
lished estimates in the recent episode depends critically on the use of real-time data. The
lower portion of Table 4 reports Kalman lter estimates using revised data from February
2004. Unlike the real-time published estimates, the Kalman lter estimates using revised
data show a steady rise during the second half of the 1990s, reﬂecting the rapid pace of
productivity gains during that period. Comparing the two Kalman lter estimates in Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the critical importance of using real-time data in empirically analyzing the
evolution of expectations.
Economists did not substantially revise upwards their views on trend growth earlier be-
cause the real-time productivity data through 1998 showed no evidence of any acceleration.
As shown in Table 3, according to the data available in early 1997, productivity growth had
actually slowed relative to its previous trend. This dip in productivity growth explains the
drop in the real-time Kalman lter estimates and is consistent with the fall in the CBO and
SPF estimates that year.
Upward revisions to past data and the robust pace of productivity growth in 1998
drive up the Kalman lter estimate in 1999, again consistent with the pattern seen in
13Table 5: Kalman Filter Estimates of Long-Run Productivity Growth, 1970{1980
Gain Vintage of Estimate (January)
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Real-time data
Benchmark 0.115 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 1.9 1.7 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.4
Low gain 0.078 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.7
High gain 0.219 2.4 1.9 2.2 2.8 2.8 1.3 1.2 1.9 1.9 1.4 .9
Change from 1970
Benchmark 0.115 | -.3 -.2 .1 .1 -.7 -.9 -.6 -.6 -.9 -1.2
Low gain 0.078 | -.2 -.1 .0 .0 -.5 -.7 -.5 -.6 -.8 -1.0
High gain 0.219 | -.5 -.2 .4 .4 -1.1 -1.2 -.5 -.5 -1.0 -1.5
Revised data
Benchmark 0.115 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.9
Low gain 0.078 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.1
High gain 0.219 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.8 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.5
Change from 1970
Benchmark 0.115 | -.1 .1 .2 .2 -.3 -.2 -.1 -.2 -.3 -.6
Low gain 0.078 | -.1 .0 .1 .1 -.2 -.2 -.1 -.2 -.3 -.5
High gain 0.219 | -.2 .2 .4 .5 -.5 -.3 .0 -.2 -.3 -.9
the contemporaneous published sources. Then, the comprehensive revision of the national
accounts in late 1999 had a dramatic eect on the Kalman lter estimates and heavily
inﬂuenced economists' views of trend productivity growth, as evidenced by the large upward
revision in the estimates published in early 2000. As noted above, methodological changes in
the national income accounts that took eect in late 1999 boosted estimates of past output
growth, and the eects of these changes and the revisions to recent data are reﬂected in the
2000 vintage Kalman lter estimates.14 This pattern of relatively weak real-time estimates
of long-run productivity growth, followed by a signicant upward revision, accounts for the
wide divergence in the Kalman lter estimates between those based on real-time data and
14Forecasters were aware of these methodological issues at the time. In fact, the SPF asked a special
question in the fall of 1999 regarding the eects of the benchmark revision on respondents estimates of
long-run growth, and the mean upward revision was about 0.2 percentage point.
14Figure 3: Evolution of Long-run Productivity Expectations in the 1970s










Kalman filter: real−time data
Kalman filter: revised data
Notes: All series are relative to the respective 1970 value. The squares indicate the available
observations. The Kalman lter estimates are based on an annual gain of 0.115.
those based on revised data.
Kalman lter estimates from the 1970s track the implicit estimates of trend productivity
growth from the CEA during the late 1970s reasonably well. The solid line in Figure 3 shows
the CEA estimates (the squares indicate years for which we have readings from the ERP).
The dashed line shows the benchmark Kalman lter estimates. The estimates for the three
values of the gain are reported in the upper part of Table 5. As before, the Kalman lter
estimates with the high value of the gain are excessively volatile relative to the real-time
published estimates.
Overall, the benchmark Kalman lter estimates do a remarkable job of matching the
real-time estimates of long-run productivity growth during the periods of the productivity
slowdown in the 1970s and following the acceleration in the 1990s. We now turn to the
implications of gradual recognition on the dynamic responses of the economy to a shift in
the trend rate of productivity growth.
154 The Model Economy
We illustrate the eects of the gradual recognition of a shift in productivity growth using
a standard two-sector neoclassical growth model with endogenous labor supply. In this
section, we describe a standard real business cycle model and the solution method. In
the following section, we analyze the eects of permanent shocks to the growth rate of
productivity.
4.1 Production Technology and Preferences
Let Ct and It denote the output of the consumption and investment goods sectors in period t.
The technologies to produce consumption and investment are assumed to be identical except
for a scale factor reﬂecting the dierent levels of TFP in the two sectors. Specically, the









where Kj;t and Lj;t denote the quantities of capital and labor employed in each sector j, At
represents the aggregate technology process that aects both sectors equally, and Zt is the
technology process that is specic to the investment-goods producing sector.
The aggregate capital accumulation technology is given by:
Kt+1 =( 1− )Kt + It; (7)
where  is the rate of physical depreciation. We assume that capital is freely mobile across
the two sectors, where the sum of the two capital stocks used in production is restricted
not to exceed the aggregate capital stock; specically, Kc;t + Ki;t  Kt.





where  is the household's rate of time preference and Ut denotes the momentary utility in























16where Ht denotes the size of the household, Lt represents total labor input from the house-
hold, γ is the inverse of the household's intertemporal elasticity of consumption, and  is
a parameter that governs the household's elasticity of labor supply. We assume that la-
bor is freely mobile across the two sectors, where the sum of the labor inputs in the two
sectors cannot exceed the aggregate labor input that period: Lc;t + Li;t  Lt, which itself
may not exceed the aggregate time endowment. Since we normalize the time endowment of
each member of the household to unity, the aggregate time endowment is equal to Ht.W e
assume that the population grows at a constant gross rate Gh, specically, Ht+1 = GhHt.
4.2 The Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
Given the assumptions regarding technology and preferences and the absence of distortions
in the model economy, the decentralized competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the solu-
tion of the social planning problem that maximizes the welfare of the representative agent.
We start by characterizing the solution to the social planner's problem with complete in-
formation about all shocks. In the next section, we turn to the solution where expectations
are based on an estimate of long-run productivity growth computed using a version of the
Kalman lter.
The planner's problem in period t is to maximize household welfare (equation 8) subject
to the consumption and investment sector production functions (equations 5 and 6), the
accumulation equation (equation 7), and the two factor market constraints. The resulting










































c;t denotes the marginal utility of consumption. Equations (10) and (11) equate
the marginal product of capital and labor across the two sectors. Because the production
functions are identical up to a multiplicative term, the two sectors employ labor and capital
in the same proportions in both sectors. Equation (12) is the standard intertemporal Euler
17equation, augmented to include changes in the relative productivity of the investment goods
sector. Equation (13) is the within period condition for the choice of labor input. The
marginal rate of transformation between investment goods and consumption, that is, the
relative \price" of investment goods, is given by Z
−(1−)
t .
It is useful to construct a real output measure consistent with the current use of chain-
weighted aggregation in the U.S. national income accounts. Correspondingly, we dene real


















represents nominal investment and Y N
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nominal output. Again for comparison to the data, we construct a synthetic real 10-year





















is the ex ante real return to capital.
4.3 The Deterministic Steady State
To characterize the deterministic balanced growth steady state of the model, we assume that
A and Z increase at constant gross growth rates Ga and Gz, respectively. The steady-state
growth rates of consumption, investment, and output are then given by:
Gc = GhGaG
z; (15)




where Gx denotes the steady-state gross growth rate of variable X,a n dsc denotes the
steady-state ratio of labor employed producing consumption goods. Along the balanced
growth path, labor input increases at a gross rate Gh, and the aggregate capital stock
increases at the same rate as investment. In the steady-state, hours per person is constant.
Thus, the steady-state rate of growth of labor productivity equals the ratio of the steady-
state growth rate of output to that of population. Nominal investment and nominal output
increase at the same rate as real consumption.
18To solve and simulate the model, it is useful to work with normalized variables, which are
denoted by lower case letters. In particular, the following normalizations yield stationary
variables along the balanced growth path: l = L




The rst-order condition for the consumption-saving choice (equation 12) yields the
following steady-state relationship between the gross real rate of return on capital, R,a n d

















The steady-state share of labor used to produce consumption goods is given by:
sc =1− (Gi − 1+): (20)






For the simulations, we calibrate the model to annual data using standard parameter values
taken from the literature. In particular, we set  =0 :36; =0 :98;γ =1 ; =3 ; and
 =0 :10. We calibrate the steady-state growth rates from long-run post-war averages: Gz =
1:014;G a =1 :014 and Gh =1 :014. Together these imply annual steady-state per capita
growth rates of 1.9 percent for consumption, 2.8 percent for investment, and 2.2 percent for
chain-weighted output (and labor productivity).
4.5 Solution Method
The model simulations consider permanent shocks to the trend growth rates of technology.
Unlike shocks to the level of technology typically studied in the literature, these shocks
imply permanent changes in the levels of normalized variables. For example, the steady-
state consumption share and labor input both depend on the steady-state growth rates Ga
and Gz. Therefore, log-linear approximations around a particular steady-state may provide
19relatively poor approximations to the dynamic response to growth shocks. For this reason,
we use nonlinear methods to compute the dynamic responses to the shocks. Following
Judd (1992), we use higher-order polynomial approximations to the decision rules describing
the behavior of the economy.15
We use orthogonal collocation, which is an application of Galerkin methods described
in Fletcher (1984), to compute the approximate decision rules. In particular, the decision
rules for labor input and consumption are approximated by fth-order polynomial functions
of the three state variables: the normalized capital stock, the trend growth rate of aggre-
gate technology, and the trend growth rate of investment-goods technology. A Chebyshev
polynomial basis is used to represent the decision rules; tensor products of the states are
used in the polynomial representations. A nonlinear equation solver is used to nd the
coecients of the decision rules that satisfy the stochastic rst-order equations at a xed
set of points in the three states, where the points are the roots of the Chebyshev polyno-
mial basis. Expectations in the rst-order equations are approximated using an eight-point
Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule. This method is extremely ecient and accurate.16 Using
these approximate decision rules and the law of motion of the economy, we compute impulse
responses to shocks to the technology processes, with each impulse response starting at the
balanced-growth steady state.
5 Eects of Shifts in the Trend Growth Rate
In this section, we consider simulations of permanent shocks to the growth rate of technol-
ogy. We consider two alterative sources for the shift in productivity growth. In one, the
change aects both the consumption and investment goods sectors equally, roughly consis-
tent with the evidence from the productivity slowdown in the 1970s. In the second, the
15We compared the simulation results using the nonlinear method to those obtained using a log-
linearization of the system. The log-linear simulations were generally reasonably close to those using the
nonlinear method; the largest deviation occurs in the response of labor input.
16It takes 20 seconds on a 1.2Mhz Pentium III computer to solve for the fth-order polynomial decision
rules of this model. One metric for approximation error used by Judd (1992) is the maximum absolute error
in the rst-order equations, normalized to be in terms of consumption units, computed over a wide range of
points for the state variables. For the model in this paper, the maximum absolute error is less than 0.001
percent.
20shift occurs only in the investment goods sector, consistent with the evidence of Cummins
and Violante (2002) regarding the productivity acceleration in the 1990s. We rst examine
the long-run implications of such shocks and then analyze the dynamic path via which the
model economy arrives at the new long-run equilibrium.
5.1 Steady-state Eects
Consider rst the steady-state eects of a permanent increase in the growth rate of the
aggregate technology process, Ga. From the steady-state conditions we see that a percent-
age point increase in the growth rate of aggregate technology implies an increase of the
same magnitude in the steady-state growth rates of per capita consumption, investment,
and output (equation 15 and 17). The implied faster rate of decline in marginal utility
implies a higher real return on capital (equation 18), as consumers demand a higher return
on savings to forgo consumption today. The higher real return in turn implies a lower
steady-state normalized capital-to-output ratio (equation 19). The consumption-to-output
ratio (equation 20) may rise or fall depending on two opposing eects: Faster growth ne-
cessitates greater investment to hold the normalized capital-to-output ratio constant; but,
the higher rate of return implies a lower optimal capital-to-output ratio. It is not possible
to sign ap r i o r ithe net eect on the consumption-to-output ratio. In addition, it is not
possible to sign the steady-state eect on labor supply (equation 21), since labor supply is
a decreasing function of the consumption-to-output ratio. For our calibration, the former
eect dominates, and the steady-state consumption-to-output ratio falls in response to an
increase in the rate of growth of aggregate TFP. As a result, labor supply rises slightly with
an increase in Ga:
Now consider the eects of a permanent increase in the growth rate of the investment-
specic technology process Gz. A percentage point increase in the growth rate of investment-
sector TFP has a smaller eect on consumption growth than a change in aggregate TFP
growth of the same magnitude (equation 15), since the former increases consumption growth
only through the capital-deepening channel. We therefore consider a slightly larger increase
in the growth rate of Gz; specically, one which yields a percentage point increase in the
growth rate of consumption and hence an increase in the real interest rate equal to that
implied by our aggregate TFP growth-rate shock (equation 18). Despite generating the
same-sized increase in real interest rates, the investment sector productivity acceleration|
21Figure 4: Productivity Acceleration with Immediate Recognition






































Notes: Productivity growth and the long-term bond rate are measured as percentage point
deviations from their respective pre-shock steady state value; all other variables are shown
as percent deviations from the pre-shock steady state. The horizontal axis is measured in
years.
since it also implies a larger capital loss|results in a slightly greater increase in the cost of
capital and hence a slightly larger decrease in the capital-to-output ratio (equation 19). As
in the case of an acceleration in aggregate TFP, it is not possible to sign the eect of an
acceleration in investment-goods TFP on the nominal consumption-to-output ratio or of the
labor supply (equation 20 and 21). For our calibration, the nominal consumption-to-output
ratio falls, implying that the labor supply increases with an increase in Gz.
225.2 Dynamic Responses to an Observed Productivity Acceleration
We now consider the eects of an unanticipated increase in the rate of growth of aggregate
TFP that is immediately observed, where the shock is scaled to yield a one percentage point
long-run increase in the growth rates of consumption. The solid lines in Figure 4 show the
results of this experiment.
At the onset of an increase in the rate of trend aggregate TFP growth, the existing
capital-to-output ratio exceeds its new steady-state level, since, as just discussed, the higher
rate of long-run growth implies a higher long-run rate of return, as seen by the response
of the long-term bond rate. The equilibrium response to the resulting capital overhang is
a sharp decline in investment, which generates the required liquidation of capital. Con-
sumption increases immediately following the shock, osetting the decline in investment
and leaving output about unchanged, and hours decline.17 These negative responses of
investment and hours following a positive shock to aggregate TFP growth are consistent
with the \perverse" pattern noted by Campbell (1994).18 After the initial phase during
which capital stocks are run down, investment growth picks up again and attains its new
balanced growth path. In the long run, consumption, investment, and output increase one
percentage point faster than before the shock to aggregate TFP growth.
Qualitatively, the responses to an unanticipated permanent increase in the growth rate
of investment-specic TFP|shown by the dashed lines in Figure 4|are similar to those of
an upward shift in the growth rate of economy-wide TFP. The shock is scaled to yield the
same one percentage point increase in the growth rate of consumption and nominal output
as the previous experiment. Real investment initially falls following the shock as do hours
and real output.
5.3 Dynamic Responses with Learning
We now modify the model to allow for imperfect information about whether the shock to
productivity growth is transitory or permanent. As noted in the introduction, we assume
17In this model, hours rise in response to a productivity acceleration only if labor supply is highly inelastic
and households have a very high rate of intertemporal substitution.
18Campbell (1994) simulated a highly persistent negative shock to the rate of productivity growth, while
we simulate a permanent positive one. The distinction between a highly persistent shock and a permanent
one is not important, as the two experiments yield qualitatively similar results.
23Figure 5: Productivity Acceleration with Gradual Recognition





































Note: See Figure 4.
that agents in the model economy face the same signal extraction problem in separating
transitory from permanent movements in productivity growth as econometricians studying
macroeconomic data.19 In particular, we assume that agents observe only the aggregate level
of labor productivity and update their estimate of the long-run growth rate of productivity
using the Kalman lter updating equation (equation 3). We assume that agents initially
know the growth rate of aggregate technology, Ga, and of investment-sector technology,
Gz, and in the simulation they increase their estimate of Ga one-for-one with the increase
19An interesting extension of our analysis would be the case where agents have asymmetric information
about idiosyncratic shocks versus aggregate shocks, viewing a shift in productivity growth as primarily
idiosyncratic to their own experience and update their views of aggregate productivity growth using the
Kalman lter.
24in the estimate of trend labor productivity generated by Kalman lter updating.20 Note
that for this experiment the updating of trend productivity growth is applied only to the
perceived trend growth rate of aggregate TFP; we assume that the perceived trend growth
rate of investment-specic TFP is not aected. We set the gain  for updating estimates of
trend labor productivity growth equal to 0.115, consistent with the evidence from Kalman
lter estimation and from economists' real-time estimates of trend productivity growth, as
discussed above. (Later, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the gain.)
In an economy where agents lter incoming information to estimate the trend productiv-
ity growth rate, hours, output, and investment all rise in response to a permanent increase
in aggregate TFP growth, and, as a result, the economy experiences a prolonged boom.
The solid line in Figure 5 reports the results from the same experiment of a permanent
increase in the growth rate of aggregate TFP as before but with gradual recognition of the
source of the shock. In the rst few years after the onset of the shock, agents believe that
the trend growth rate has risen only very modestly and attribute most of the higher level
of productivity to a sequence of positive shocks to the level of productivity (t shocks in
terms of our notation in equations 1 and 2). In this model, such level shocks boost hours,
output, and investment, with only relatively small eects on the real interest rate.21 Only
when the perceived long-run rate of productivity growth rises do rates on long-term bonds
rise signicantly as well.22
20We also have conducted these experiments assuming that agents directly update their expectations of
trend TFP growth based on observations of TFP instead of indirectly through their observations of labor
productivity growth. The results are very similar to those reported here.
21Our model predicts hours to increase following a positive permanent shock to the level of technology and
is in this respect consistent with the empirical responses reported by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Linde (2002) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003a, 2003b). In contrast, Basu, Fernald, and
Kimball (1998), Gal  (1999), and Francis and Ramey (2001) nd that hours initially decline in response to
a positive permanent shock to the level of TFP, although this decline is generally only transitory such that
a rise in employment eventually transpires. Thus, even in a model that generates an hours response similar
to the those found by these authors, a string of positive shocks still leads to a lagged boom in employment.
Thus, our conclusions as to the importance of agents initially mistaking an acceleration in TFP growth as a
sequence of TFP level shocks do not rely on sign of the impact response of hours to a permanent shock to
the level of productivity.
22Brayton and Reifschneider (2001) examine shifts in long-run productivity using the Federal Reserve's
large-scale macroeconomic model, and also nd that an increase in the long-run rate of productivity growth
generates a sustained boom in employment and investment. Importantly, in their model simulations, interest
25The eects of an acceleration in productivity in the investment-goods sector alone is
shown by the dashed lines of Figure 5. For this experiment, we assume that agents under-
stand that the shock is specic to the investment-goods sector but do not know whether
the increase in productivity growth is transitory or permanent. We use the same gain 
as before but adjust the updating formula to reﬂect the fact that an increase in Gz has a
proportionally smaller eect on aggregate labor productivity growth than a similar-sized
increase in Ga. In the calibrated model, Gz must increase by 0.018 to raise the steady-state
growth of output by 0.01. Thus, we multiply an increase in estimated trend aggregate labor
productivity growth by a factor of 1.8 to compute the implied increase in the perceived
value of Gz.
As before, the productivity acceleration generates a prolonged rise in hours and a mono-
tonic increase in the rate of labor productivity growth and the long-term bond rate. One
interesting distinction between the two shocks is that the dynamics of the investment-goods
sector productivity acceleration are more drawn out.
Learning has important implications for the response of long-term bond rates to shifts
in trend productivity. If an increase in the long-run rate of productivity growth were
immediately recognized, the model predicts a signicant rise in real long-term yields within
a few years of the onset of the shock. With learning, real-long terms yields rise very
gradually during the decade following the shock. The evidence from SPF expectations of
future real interest rates during the late 1990s provides some support for the model with
learning. SPF long-run expectations of real interest rates changed relatively little during
the late 1990s, before declining during the recession of 2001. Similarly, yields on inﬂation-
indexed securities (TIIS) increased gradually during the late 1990s.23 Of course, other
factors, including scal policy and the state of the business cycle, inﬂuenced expectations of
real interest rates during this period, making a sharp comparison of the model predictions
and the data dicult.
In summary, the model with learning predicts that a productivity acceleration leads to
a prolonged boom in hours and a steady increase in the rate of output and productivity
growth. The implied rise in long-term real rates occurs very gradually. These results are
rates rise only gradually in response to the faster rate of growth.
23TIIS securities were rst issued in early 1997. See Bomm (2001) for a discussion of the use of TIIS
yields in measuring real rate expectations.
26Figure 6: Sensitivity to Gain: Aggregate TFP Acceleration





































Note: See Figure 4.
robust to reasonable variations in the assumed gain parameter. Figures 6 and 7 show
dynamic responses for the benchmark calibration (the solid line), a lower gain of 0.08 (the
dotted line), and a higher gain of 0.22 (the dashed-dotted line) to a permanent increase in
the growth rate of aggregate TFP and to investment-goods sector TFP, respectively. In all
cases, the productivity acceleration produces a sustained boom in investment and output
and a gradual rise in the long-term real interest rate.
6 Conclusion
This paper documents the diculty of estimating long-run productivity growth in real
time and establishes the importance of learning for understanding the macroeconomic con-
sequences of shifts in the trend productivity growth rate. We nd that a simple linear
updating rule based on an estimated Kalman lter model provides an extremely good de-
27Figure 7: Sensitivity to Gain: Investment-Goods Sector TFP Acceleration






































Note: See Figure 4.
scription of the evolution of economists' real-time estimates of long-run productivity growth
over both the 1970s and 1990s. We then show that incorporating the gradual recognition
of shifts in trend growth rate has considerable implications for the dynamic responses to
such shocks: If immediately recognized, an increase in the long-run productivity growth
rate|in what is markedly at odds with historical experience|causes long-term interest
rates to rise and generates a sharp decline in employment and investment. By contrast, an
identical model that diers only in that it allows for the gradual recognition of shifts in the
trend growth rate of TFP can, following a sustained rise in the rate of productivity growth,
generate positive and prolonged responses for hours and investment, and a more gradual
increase in long-term interest rates. Moreover, for our preferred calibration of the pace of
learning about productivity growth rate shifts|which equals the learning rate consistent
with published real time estimates of long-run productivity growth|an increase (decrease)
28in the long-run growth rate of productivity generates a sustained employment and invest-
ment boom (slump). This prediction represents a dramatic improvement in our model's
ability to generate responses to long-run productivity growth rate shifts that resemble the
experiences of the 1970s and 1990s.
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32Appendix
Table A1 reports the time series of the real-time Kalman lter estimates of trend labor
productivity growth, as well as estimates from the CBO, CEA, and the median and mean
values from the SPF. The rst three columns show the real-time Kalman lter estimates
using output per hour in the nonfarm business sector as the measure of labor productiv-
ity; columns four through six show the corresponding results for the total business sector
(including farms). In each case, the value of the gain  is indicated at the top of the col-
umn. The real-time data set of output per hour in the nonfarm and total business sectors
is available from the authors.
Starting with the 1997 Budget and Economic Outlook report, the CBO has each year
reported their long-run projection for output per hour in the nonfarm business sector.
These reports are generally published in January. We take the average projected rate of
productivity growth over the next 11 years to be the trend rate. In year prior to 1997,
generally no explicit gure for projected nonfarm labor productivity is given. For the 1995
and 1996 vintages, we inferred values of projected long-run productivity growth from the
reported assumptions regarding projected total factor productivity growth and the pace of
capital accumulation included in January 1995 and December 1995 reports, respectively,
using the formula given in the Congressional Budget Oce (1995) memo.
The CEA reported estimates of trend output per hour in the entire economy economy
during the 1970s. Starting in 1983, the ERP regularly reported medium-run projections of
output per hour in the nonfarm business sector in each Economic Report of the President.
The horizon for these projections varies between six and nine years, typically shorter than
those of the CBO projections and the Survey of Professional Forecasters and are therefore
not directly comparable.
The SPF started asking a question regarding the average rate of productivity growth
over the next ten years in February, 1992. The question is asked in each February survey.
The SPF is described in Croushore (1993). The SPF reports both the median and mean
response from the surveys, as well as the number of respondents. The data are available at
the web site: http:nnwww.phil.frb.orgneconnspfnindex.html.
33Table A1. Real-time Estimates of Trend Productivity Growth
Kalman Filter Published Estimates
Data Nonfarm Business Total Business CBO CEA SPF
Vintage : 0.12 0.08 0.22 0.12 0.08 0.22 Mean Median
1965 2.7 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.1
1966 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.2
1967 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.2
1968 2.6 2.7 2.5 3.1 3.1 2.9
1969 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.5
1970 2.6 2.7 2.4 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.8
1971 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.8
1972 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.9 2.5
1973 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9
1974 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.4
1975 1.9 2.2 1.3 2.2 2.5 1.5
1976 1.7 2.0 1.2 2.0 2.3 1.4
1977 2.0 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.1
1978 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.1
1979 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.9 2.2 1.5 1.5
1980 1.4 1.7 0.9 1.6 2.0 1.0 1.5
1981 1.2 1.6 0.5 1.4 1.8 0.7
1982 1.3 1.6 0.8 1.5 1.8 0.9
1983 1.1 1.5 0.6 1.4 1.7 0.8 2.1
1984 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.8
1985 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.0
1986 1.1 1.3 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.0 2.1
1987 1.1 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.9
1988 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.9
1989 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.9
1990 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.8
1991 1.0 1.2 0.7 1.2 1.4 0.8 1.8
1992 0.8 1.0 0.4 1.0 1.2 0.6 1.4 1.64 1.50
1993 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.75 1.50
1994 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.73 1.50
1995 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.60 1.50
1996 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.52 1.50
1997 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.1 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.40 1.27
1998 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.53 1.50
1999 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.66 1.55
2000 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.37 2.40
2001 2.2 2.1 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.48 2.50
2002 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.23 2.10
2003 2.2 2.1 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.37 2.30
2004 2.6 2.4 3.2 2.7 2.5 3.3 2.2 2.1 2.58 2.50
34